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I. INTRODUCTION
When it came to labor relations in professional sports, basket-
ball was always different. The National Basketball Association
("NBA") and the players' union were proud of the fact that they
worked in the only major American sport that had never lost a
game to a labor dispute.1 That all changed last year when, failing
to come to agreement on a new contract, the NBA owners locked
out the players for over six months, resulting in the cancellation of
423 regular season games. Basketball, it seemed, had descended
into the greedy narcissism that plagued every other major sport.
The 1998-99 NBA lockout, like the 1994 Major League
Baseball strike, may have serious consequences for the future of
the game. Already, the abbreviated training camps and compressed
schedules have produced a spate of injuries and scores of ugly,
3low-scoring games. And the effects of the dispute on the game
* This Essay was written by invitation from the Hofstra Labor & Employment Law Jour-
nal.
** Associate Professor of Law, Hofstra University School of Law. B.A. (1989), M.A.
(1991) University of Kansas; J.D. (1995) Stanford Law School. I am indebted to Jacqueline New-
mark and John Desiderio for their speedy research and to Kenneth Band, Luciano Hayden, and
Joanna Grossman for their careful editing. I am also grateful to Boston Celtics rookie Paul Pierce,
whose brilliant play and sunny outlook have renewed my interest in professional basketball.
1. See Mike Wise, Jan. 7 Is Stem's Deadline to Cancel Season, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 24,
1998, at DI.
2. See Lockout at a Glance, THE StN, Jan. 5, 1999, at 3D.
3. See Mike Wise, Can Anybody Here Score? Swish Turns to a Clank, N.Y. TIMES, Feb.
23, 1999, atD1.
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over the long run may be more difficult, if not impossible, to pre-
dict. But those questions are best left to those who track television
ratings and ticket office receipts. The more immediate ques-
tion-the one put to me by the editors of this journal-is what the
lockout contributed to labor law or, more generally, what the dis-
pute tells us about the state of labor relations in the United States.
So it is to those questions that I turn.
II. THE LOCKOUT AND LABOR LAW DOCTRINE
The most recent NBA labor dispute is unremarkable from a
strictly doctrinal standpoint. The owners and the players' associa-
tion were operating under a six-year collective bargaining agree-
ment signed in 1996 after the owners engaged in a brief and es-
sentially meaningless lockout.4  That agreement, however,
contained a clause under which the owners could, after three years,
reopen negotiations.5 Last spring, the owners exercised their rights
under the reopening clause,6 and when the two sides could not
reach an agreement, the owners locked the players out.
7
The centerpiece of the dispute-the lockout-was certainly
nothing unique in the annals of labor history. Lockouts occur when
employers attempt to put economic pressure on a group of em-
ployees by refusing to allow them to work.8 Depending on the role
they play in a labor dispute, lockouts are typically characterized as
4. See Clifton Brown, Deal Is a Lock, Not a Lockout, For the N.B.A., N.Y. TIMES, July 10,
1996, at Bl. That lockout was only meaningless in the sense that it lasted about ten minutes in
the middle of the night in July; it was certainly meaningful as a show of the league's strength and
as a harbinger of future league actions. The league had also locked out the players for about three
months in 1995. That lockout ended in September 1995, upon owner ratification of a new collec-
tive bargaining agreement. See Owners Approve Labor Deal, N.Y. TIMEs, Sept. 16, 1995, § 1, at
29; Murray Chass, N.B.A. Locks Out Players in First Work Stoppage, N.Y. TnIE, July 1, 1995, §
1, at 27. The 1995 agreement, however, was never signed by the players' union, giving rise to the
short lockout and new agreement in 1996. See N.B.A. Negotiations Continue, N.Y. TIMES, June
28, 1996, at B14.
5. See Harvey Araton, For N.B.A. Players Union, What Goes Around Comes Around, N.Y.
TudES, Nov. 1, 1998, § 8, at 7. The clause provided that the owners could renegotiate the contract
if players' salaries exceeded 51.8 percent of basketball-related income. The salary figure reached
57 percent, and the owners reopened the collective bargaining agreement. See Mike Wise, It's
TheirBall, andN.B.A. Owners Call for Lockout, N.Y. TIMEs, June 30, 1998, at Cl.
6. See Mike Wise, Deflected Pact: N.B.A. Owners Reopening Labor Agreement, N.Y.
TIMES, March 24, 1998, at Cl.
7. See -Wise, supra note 5, at Cl.
8. For a concise discussion of the legal status of a lockout, see ROBERT A. GORMAN, BASIC
TEXT ON LABOR LAW: UNIONIZATION AND COLLECTIVE BARGAINING 355-62 (1976).
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either offensive or defensive. Offensive lockouts occur when an
employer locks out its employees in order to pressure them to
reach an agreement on terms favorable to the employer. Such a
strategy may be deployed when an employer and union have
reached a bargaining impasse.9 Defensive lockouts, on the other
hand, occur when an employer locks out its employees to avoid
potential harm to the employer's business, property, or goodwill
that may be caused by an opportunistic strike called at the time of
the union's choosing. Such lockouts may be used by an employer
facing a whipsaw strike' or by an employer in a seasonal industry
in which a well-timed strike at peak season could bring enormous
economic pressure to bear on the employer." Whether offensive or
defensive, however, the lockout is a tried and true means for an
employer to seize the initiative in a labor dispute.
The NBA lockout was a fairly straightforward use of this
traditional economic weapon. The owners had exercised their
contractual right to reopen negotiations, and those negotiations
failed to produce a new agreement before the old one expired at
the end of June 1998. The dispute proceeded in three stages. First,
the owners engaged in an offensive lockout to put pressure on the
players' union to reach an agreement. 2 That strategy was success-
ful in that it ultimately resulted in a new contract with terms favor-
able to the owners on January 6, 1999."3 The lockout, however,
established no new legal precedent, broke no new legal ground,
and contributed little to our understanding of the nature of the eco-
nomic weapon. Indeed, it was this very lack of uniqueness-and,
9. See, e.g., American Ship Bldg. Co. v. NLRB, 380 U.S. 300 (1965) (principal Supreme
Court case on the use of offensive lockouts).
10. A whipsaw strike occurs when a union strikes against competing employers in sequence.
Unlike a simultaneous strike against all employers, a strike against a single employer allows its
competitors to continue operations, thus placing enormous economic pressure on the struck em-
ployer and, at the same time, reducing the expenditure of union resources. See NLRB v. Truck
Drivers Local Union No. 449 (Buffalo Linen Case), 353 U.S. 87 (1957).
11. See, e.g., Duluth Bottling Ass'n, 48 N.L.R.B. 1335, 1359-60 (1943) (describing how an
employer locked out its employees before they could strike in hopes of preventing a "spoilage of
materials").
12. While the seasonal nature of the basketball business may have made the lockout appear
to be defensive, the owners were not faced with any real prospect of an impending strike by the
players' union which, after initially balking at various provisions in their 1996 contract, had begun
to view the terms of their current contract with increasing favor. See Araton, supra note 5, at 7.
13. See Mike Wise, With Little Time on Clock, N.B.A. and Players Settle, N.Y. TIMES, Jan.
7, 1999, at Al.
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of course, the fact that it involved celebrities-that made the NBA
lockout a good teaching tool for an introductory labor law class.
The second major event of the labor dispute occurred in late
July when the players' union, unconvinced of the typicality or le-
gality of the lockout, filed an unfair labor practice charge with the
National Labor Relations Board. 4 The charge alleged that the
lockout was illegal both because the players were not work-
.ing-and thus were not locked out of anything-and because the
owners placed a freeze on the signing of free agents, thus
"unilaterally changing working conditions when the two sides had
not bargained to impasse." 15 The union requested that the Board
seek an injunction that would mandate an end to the lockout."6 The
Board apparently did not agree with the union, and, within a
month of its filing, the union withdrew the unfair labor practice
charge.17 Such a resolution was not atypical: of the roughly thirty-
two thousand unfair labor practice charges filed every year, over
ninety-five Vercent are either settled, dismissed, or, as in this case,
withdrawn.' In the end, then, the unfair labor practice charge went
the way of the overwhelming number of charges filed every year,
and thus also added little of substantive or procedural note to labor
law.
The third event in the NBA labor dispute was strictly contrac-
tual. The union filed a grievance on behalf of over two hundred
players with guaranteed contracts demanding that the owners be
held accountable for the salaries under those contracts during the
lockout.19 Although over eight hundred million dollars worth of
salaries were at stake,20 the arbitrator's decision was a simple case
14. See Grievance Filed on Lockout, N.Y. TIMES, July 24, 1998, at C3.
15. Murray Chass, Players Drop Charge, Look to Arbitration, N.Y. TiMES, Aug. 14, 1998, at
C4.
16. See id.; Grievance Filed on Lockout, supra note 14, at C3.
17. See Chass, supra note 15, at C4.
18. Specifically, 31 percent are settled, 33.8 percent are dismissed and 31.8 percent are
withdrawn. See 56 NLRB ANN. REP. 153, 174-75 (1994) (citing statistics for 1991 fiscal year).
19. See Mike Wise, Players File Salary Grievance, N.Y. TIMEs, July 2, 1998, at C6, In re-
sponse, the league sued the players' union in federal district court seeking a ruling that the league
need not pay the players during the lockout and that the matter not go to arbitration. See Mike
Wise, N.B.A. Sues Players Union Over Pay During Lockout, N.Y. TIMES, July 14, 1998, at C3.
Their request for a stay of arbitration was denied. See Jeffrey A. Rosenthal, The NBA Lockout: Is
Union Decertiftcation The Next Step?, N.Y.L.J., Nov. 27, 1998, at 5.
20. See Mike Wise, N.B.A. Owners Needn't Pay Locked-Out Players, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 20,
1998, at D1.
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of contractual interpretation.2' The arbitrator ruled against the
players, putting them in the same position as that of their locked-
out counterparts in more mundane professions-out of a pay-
check.22 The ruling came as no great surprise and broke no real
ground in the interpretation of collective bargaining agreements.
Thus, from start to finish, the NBA lockout and related skir-
mishes made no noteworthy contributions to legal doctrine.
Rather, they were merely high-profile examples of rather pedes-
trian labor disputes. The reason the dispute achieved such notori-
ety and led to, among other things, an invitation to comment on its
impact, is because it involved employees with extraordinary skills
and celebrity status working in a prominent industry. But, these
extralegal qualities of the dispute should not be underestimated.
Instead, it is to these unique attributes of the NBA labor dispute
that we must look in assessing the lockout's contribution to our
understanding of labor law. In other words, one needs to look less
at what the NBA lockout means to the development of labor law
doctrine (very little) and more to what the high profile lockout tells
us about the state of the labor movement and public perceptions of
unions.
II. THE LOCKOUT AND THE LABOR MOVEMENT
While the ability of a group of employees to collectively face
and withstand an extended lockout would normally signal union
vitality, the NBA labor dispute instead presents a study in contrast
between the economic power of professional athletes and that of
more ordinary workers. More specifically, the dispute highlights
the dramatic differences between highly-skilled and less highly-
skilled workers in terms of their relative abilities to flex their eco-
nomic muscle in collective bargaining relationships. And these dif-
ferences, in turn, point to a failure of our labor laws to protect
workers who truly need their protections against increasingly ag-
gressive employer tactics.
It is no great secret that, in the United States, labor is on the
run. Union membership in the private nonagricultural workforce
declined to 9.6 percent in 1998,2 continuing a downward spiral
21. See Rosenthal, supra note 19, at 5.
22. See id.
23. See United States Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics, Union Members in
1999]
Hofstra Labor & Employment Law Journal
that dates back to the 1950s. Even with the addition of an increas-
ingly unionized public sector, union membership in all sectors still
stands at less than 14 percent.24 An American worker is less likely
to belong to a union today than at any time in the past several dec-
ades.
Nearly fifty years of data on work stoppages from the Bureau
of Labor Statistics tell a similar story. In the period from 1950 to
1957, for example, there were 2,940 work stoppages involving a
thousand or more workers2s Those work stoppages involved al-
most 13 million workers and resulted in over 187 million days
idle.26 By contrast, the period from 1990 to 1997, despite a much
larger workforce, only saw 267 such work stoppages involving 2.2
million workers and about 39 million days idle.27 Indeed, there
were only 29 work stoppages in 1997 involving more than a thou-
sand workers, a far cry from the early 1950s, which regularly saw
over 400 such stoppages per year.28
Thus, union membership is down, and American workers are
increasingly unwilling to engage in the work stoppages-either by
calling strikes or risking lockouts-that are traditionally their most
powerful economic weapons. But as labor's numbers and power
decline, there is no shortage of explanations for the lOSS. 29 Many of
the explanations point to extralegal causes of the decline of union-
ism, such as cyclical variations in the economy," changes in the
nature of the workforce from heavy industry to white collar and
service sectors3' and the transfer of capital from the Northeast to
1998 (last modified Jan. 25, 1999) <ftp:/146.142.4.23/pub/news.release/union2.txt>.
24. See id.
25. See United States Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics, Work Stoppage Data




29. For a brief survey of various explanations for the decline of unions, see MICHAEL
GOLDFIELD, THE DECLINE OF ORGANIZED LABOR IN THE UNITED STATES 94-112 (1987). For a
good list of studies on union growth and decline, see Gary Chaison & Joseph Rose, The
Macrodeterminants of Union Growth and Decline, in THE STATE OF THE UNIONS 12-36 (George
Strauss et al. eds., 1991).
30. See, e.g., Jack Fiorito & Charles R. Greer, Determinants of U.S. Unionism: Past Re.
search and Future Needs, 21 INDuS. REL. 1, 12 (1982) (noting that "business downturns... create
fundamental unrest as a result of layoffs" and that this discord could have a "positive effect on
unionization").
31. For a brief recounting of this argument, see Chaison & Rose, supra note 30, at 12-16.
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the less union-friendly environs of the South and Southwest. 2
Such explanations are in accord with the more traditional historical
view that social and economic forces drive the development of the
law rather than the converse. But while I think that view of history
is fundamentally correct, there needs to be some account of the
role of the law in providing greater or lesser opportunities for par-
ties to act out their socially-determined ends. Thus, explanations
for labor's weakness that focus less upon the economic and social
factors and more upon the role of employer resistance in a world
of diminishing legal protections have some explanatory power.34
And I think the NBA lockout illustrates some of that power.
With the passage of the Wagner Act in 1935, American labor
was accorded unprecedented power to exercise its economic might
without fear of the reprisals traditionally taken by employers. But
what Congress gave, the courts, at least partially, took away. In
NLRB v. Mackay Radio & Telegraph Co., 35 for example, the Su-
preme Court held that an employer may not base a decision to re-
instate on union activity, but then went on to note-in some of the
most famous dicta in the Court's history-that an employer may
permanently replace economic strikers.36 What should have been a
relatively innocuous decision became, at least in theory, a power-
ful limit on the rights of workers to strike. And while the full ex-
32. For a summary of this argument, see GOLDFIELD, supra note 29, at 96-99.
33. See, e.g., WILLIAM E. FORBATH, LAW AND THE SHAPING OF THE AMERICAN LABOR
MOvEMENT 168 (1991) (arguing that the widespread use of labor injunctions at the turn of the
century tempered the more radical goals of the American labor movement). Forbath is but one ex-
ample of a growing number of scholars who question the relegation of law and legal institutions to
the status of mere epiphenomena of history. See, e.g., Robert Gordon, Critical Legal Histories, 36
STAN. L. REv. 57, 57 (1984) (attempting "to give a brief account of the impulses that have
prompted the Critical scholars to their chosen ways of writing history").
34. For a general discussion of the employer-resistance theory of the decline of labor, see
Chaison & Rose, supra note 30, at 22-24. Employers, of course, make use of both legal and illegal
tactics in fighting union representation. Some of the principal illegal tactics include firing union
supporters and refusing to bargain with newly certified unions. See, e.g., Paul C. Weiler, Promises
to Keep: Securing Workers' Rights to Self-Organization Under the NLRA, 96 HARV. L. REV. 1769,
1773-79 (1983). There are, however, a wide range of legal obstacles that employers may place in
the path of unions, and those legal obstacles are the focus of this essay. See Remarks of NLRB
Chairman Gould to New York University's National Conference on Labor, Cooperation or Con-
flict: Problems and Potential in the National Labor Relations Act, Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No.
105, at D-25 (June 1, 1995) (arguing that legal reform of rules governing the use of permanent
replacements, penalties for the discharge of union supporters, and non-employee access to em-
ployer premises would strengthen labor).
35. 304 U.S. 333 (1938).
36. See id. at 345-46.
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tent of an employer's right to use temporary or permanent re-
placements during lockouts is less settled, employers clearly retain
some prerogative to replace the workers they have locked out.
3 7
For decades, employers rarely exercised their right to perma-
nently replace striking workers, perhaps because the effect of do-
ing so was often unpredictable. 38 But in the 1970s and 1980s, em-
ployers began to doubt the advantages of the postwar labor accord,
and started to exercise their dormant powers to replace workers. 9
The use of replacements was not, of course, the only weapon in
management's arsenal of legal and illegal union busting tactics,
but it was a prominent one, and one that can be reasonably well-
charted.
President Reagan's replacement of striking air traffic control-
lers during the PATCO dispute is widely viewed as the signal to
employers to take the offensive when it comes to work stoppages.4"
A decade later, the legacy of that initial signal played out in an-
other high profile dispute-the Caterpillar strike and lockout.
During a contract dispute with Caterpillar, the United Auto Work-
ers called for a strike of the company's East Peoria and Decatur,
Illinois, plants.4' The company responded by locking out workers
in two other locations, triggering a full-blown work stoppage in-
volving over twelve thousand employees.42 Several months into
the strike, Caterpillar announced that it planned to permanently
replace striking workers.43 Shortly thereafter, the union called an
end to its strike, with one UAW lobbyist commenting that the an-
nouncement to hire permanent replacements "had a 'devastating'
impact... especially among middle-aged workers with families or
those nearing retirement who could not risk losing their jobs."
37. See ROBERTA. GORMAN, BASIC TEXT ON LABOR LAW: UNIONIZATION AND COLLECTIVE
BARGAINING 360-61 (1976).
38. See Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 74, at A-11 (Apr. 16, 1992).
39. See Richard Edwards & Michael Podgursky, The Unraveling Accord: American Unions
in Crisis, in UNIONS IN CRISES AND BEYOND: PERSPECTIVES FROM SIX COUNTRIES 15, 32-33
(Richard Edwards et al. eds., 1986).
40. See Michael H. LeRoy, Severance of Bargaining Relationships During Replacement
Strikes and Union Decertifications: An Empirical Analysis and Proposal to Amend Section 9(c)(3)
of the NLRA, 29 U.C. DAVIS L. REv. 1019, 1051-52 n.133 (1996).
41. For a concise history of the Caterpillar dispute, see Marc J. Bloch & Scott A. Moorman,
Working to Rule and Other Alternate Job Actions, 9 LAB. LAw. 169, 175-78 (1993).
42. See iL at 175.
43. See Caterpillar Threatens to Replace Strikers, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 2, 1992, at Dl.
44. Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 74, at A-12 (Apr. 16, 1992).
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The PATCO and Caterpillar strikes were not just high profile
signals to other employers-and labor unions-of the potency of
the threat of permanent replacement. The strikes also signaled the
willingness of employers to replace relatively highly-skilled em-
ployees. The striking air traffic controllers, despite the illegality of
their strike, believed that the government would never-indeed,
could never-replace them. They were wrong. Union leaders in the
Caterpillar strike believed that because Caterpillar's workers were
so highly-skilled, the company could not make a credible threat of
replacement.45 They were also wrong.
By the early 1990s, a survey of over 273 employers by the
Bureau of National Affairs revealed that thirty-two percent said
that they would replace striking workers and another forty-eight
percent said that they would consider such a move; only eighteen
percent said that they would not replace striking workers.46 It takes
no great leap of faith to conclude that this attitudinal change to-
ward the use of replacements, coupled with the state's relatively
weak protections against such tactics, has played a role in stripping
the strike and threat of strike of their power and contributed
greatly to the decline in the number of work stoppages.
As the use of such tactics increases, labor unions and the
workers that they protect suffer. But like most suffering, it does
not befall everyone equally. While such tactics have been used
against relatively highly-skilled workers, it is clearly the lesser
skilled and unskilled workers who have the most to fear, simply
because they are most easily replaced. More highly-skilled work-
ers have less to fear, and the most highly-skilled workers-workers
that may even be irreplaceable-have nothing to fear and, indeed,
may actually be emboldened by their unique status. Which brings
us to a worker on the far end of the highly-skilled spectrum: the
professional athlete.
Professional athletes are some of the most highly-skilled
workers in the world. They possess natural physical abilities,
honed by years of practice, that cannot be easily duplicated with
mere hard work or good fortune. With some training, and thicker
45. See Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 182, at A-5 (Sept. 18, 1992).
46. See Kirk Victor Labor's Saived-Off Stick, NAT'L J., June 6, 1992, at 1353. While little
hard data on the use of striker replacements exists, a study by the General Accounting Office con-
cluded that the use of replacements was more commonplace in the late 1980s than in the late
1970s. See Matthew W. Finkin, Labor Policy and the Enervation of the Economic Strike, 1990 U.
ILL. L. REv. 547, 548-49 n.12 (1990).
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glasses, I could probably be a competent air traffic controller. With
some years of education as an actor or a rock musician, and a
lucky break, I might be able to make a living in the entertainment
industry. However, much to my dismay, I will never play in the
NBA. One cannot simply take an ordinary person, train them for a
few years, and turn them into a power forward that can square off
with Karl Malone or, for that matter, into a centerfielder with a
chance of hitting a Roger Clemens' fastball.
The unique status of the professional athlete is highlighted
whenever a work stoppage occurs. Owners of professional sports
franchises, even when faced with the revenue losses that may ac-
company a strike or lockout, rarely consider using temporary or
permanent replacements. There is no evidence that the owners in
the current NBA lockout ever seriously considered using replace-
ments.47 During the Major League Baseball strike in 1994, some of
the owners embarrassed themselves by toying with the idea of
continuing the season using replacement players. 4s And though
replacement players were used for three games during the 1987
professional football strike, the effort was not very successful, and
probably only possible because football players, with the excep-
tion of star players in the skill positions, are relatively anonymous
in comparison to their counterparts in baseball, basketball, and
hockey.49 Professional athletes operate in what is essentially a
closed labor market, which gives them a tremendous advantage
over their counterparts in other occupations."
The unique status of most professional athletes gives their
unions power and may be one of the primary reasons that sports
unions are thriving while their more traditional counterparts are in
deep trouble.5' The unique status also helps explain why, in this
world of fewer and fewer work stoppages, we see so many upscale
labor disputes, such as the NBA lockout or the American Airlines'
47. N.B.A. Commissioner David Stem noted, in rejecting the union's final offer, that he
could "envision" the use of replacement players. See Mike Wise, Its Offer Spurned, Union Will
Vote on N.B.A. Plan, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 5 1999, at Al. However, there is little evidence that this
was ever a serious threat.
48. See Steven Greenhouse, Power Bargaining: Walking the Picket Line in Gucci Loafers,
N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 22, 1998, § 4, at 4.
49. See Murray Chass, As Trade Unions Struggle, Their Sports Cousins Thrive, N.Y. TIMES,
Sept. 5, 1994, § 1, at 1.
50. Professional sports leagues also operate in a market sheltered from competition from this
country or abroad. See id.
51. See id.
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pilot sickout, 2 and fewer stoppages involving less skilled workers.
Professional athletes and other highly-skilled workers are more
willing to engage in a work stoppage either by initiating a strike or
by standing up to management in the face of a lockout.
Of course, it should come as no surprise that an NBA athlete
is in a stronger position than a line worker at the Caterpillar plant.
Highly-skilled workers have always been better situated than their
lesser-skilled counterparts to exercise their rights to engage in
concerted action-a difference that in part explains the historical
division of craft and industrial unions. After passage of the Na-
tional Labor Relations Act, however, the combination of legal
protections and employer norms allowed both groups to effec-
tively wield economic power by engaging in work stoppages. As
demonstrated by the precipitous decline in the number of work
stoppages, this is no longer the case. Fewer and fewer workers feel
free to make their demands felt in the same ways that they have in
the past. Even the professional basketball players, despite their
ability to weather a long lockout, settled on terms favorable to the
owners.
The NBA lockout, then, is a high profile example of a labor
dispute involving one of the few groups of workers that retains the
ability to make use of one of labor's traditional prerogatives-the
right to withhold one's labor. While such resolve may at first
glance appear as a form of labor's strength, it must be viewed
against a backdrop of the diminishing ability of less-skilled em-
ployees to withhold their labor in the face of weak legal protec-
tions and increasingly aggressive employer tactics. Professional
basketball players are merely the exception that proves the new
order-an order in which the most vulnerable workers are given
the least protection.
IV. THE LOCKOUT AND PUBLIC A'rnruDEs TOWARD LABOR
While the NBA labor dispute illustrates the widening gap in
the power of highly-skilled and less-skilled workers to engage in
work stoppages, and thus highlights one aspect of the decline of
labor in the United States, the dispute may also make its own
small contribution to that decline. Most workers probably perceive
52. See Laurence Zuckerman, 330 American Flights Are Canceled in a Dispute With Pilots,
N.Y. TMES, Feb. 8, 1999, at A14.
19991
Hofstra Labor & Employment Law Journal
few similarities between their working lives and the working lives
of professional basketball players, and those perceptions were only
enhanced by the way the players' union and its members were
portrayed in the popular press. As a result, the NBA lockout may
have strengthened the view of many that unions are out of touch
with their lives and thus have little to offer them.
The NBA players certainly did little to enhance their connec-
tion with the average American worker (or fan). New York Knicks
center Patrick Ewing, who is one of the leaders of the players'
union and earns over $18.5 million dollars per year,53 complained
that the owners were trying to take food out of his mouth.m Boston
Celtics point guard Kenny Anderson became the poster boy for a
group of disconnected, filthy-rich players in late October when he
joked in an interview about the financial strain of the lockout 5
Anderson whined about the financial burden of maintaining his
Beverly Hills home (rented at $12,500 per month), his fleet of
eight luxury cars, and his monthly child support of $7,200 for two
children born to different women.56 He noted that the loss of his
NBA paycheck meant that he had to "get tight," a prospect that
may have meant selling one of his eight cars.
The players' association did little to correct this image. The
union chose Las Vegas, of all places, to hold its primary strategy
session.58 Later, a group of star players and their agents announced
their intention to play a charity benefit game with the proceeds to
go to UNICEF and, somewhat surprisingly, cash-strapped NBA
players.5 9 After being besieged by the negative publicity that came
with asking the public to pay up to five hundred dollars per seat to
benefit players who had trouble managing, at a minimum,
$275,000 per year, the game's organizers announced that all the
proceeds would go to charitable organizations. 6 The players' un-
53. See Mike Wise, N.B.A., Players to Talk Without Preconditions, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 2,
1998, at D5.
54. See George Vecsey, Players Saw It Was Time To Provide, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 8, 1999, at
Dl.
55. See Mike Wise, When Millionaires Are Laid Off, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 26, 1998, at Dl.
56. See id.
57. Id. He did not have to sell any of the cars. See Mike Wise, He Keeps Cars and Helps
Others, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 24, 1998, at D2.
58. See William C. Rhoden, Hardly The Boys Next Door, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 28, 1998, at Dl.
59. See Selena Roberts, Players Seek To Give, and Receive, Too, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 8, 1998,
at Dl.
60. See Mike Wise, Proceeds Won't Go To Players, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 11, 1998, at D4.
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ion seemed more like a social club for the rich and famous than an
advocate for employee rights, and the players and their representa-
tive did little to dispel that perception.
Though the members of the players' union were savaged in
the press as a group of spoiled millionaires, surprisingly little was
61
written about such things as their philanthropic enterprises or
their willingness to sacrifice an entire year of their relatively short
careers for the good of the collective. But the most glaring press
omission may have been a general lack of discussion of the one
thing that would have put the players' salaries in perspective-the
owners' profits.62 In part, this lack of coverage may have been be-
cause the players were losing large sums of money every time an-
other set of games was canceled, and the owners were, by and
large, losing only the revenue gained from ticket and concession
sales. For while the players' contracts were not guaranteed, the
owners' contracts with the National Broadcasting Company and
Turner Sports for $465 million provided an uninterrupted revenue
flow throughout the course of the lockout.63 NBA franchises con-
tinued to be a valued asset during the lockout and, indeed, some
franchises actually came out ahead (principally because the lock-
out removed their biggest expense-player salaries) .' But since
Some viewed the charity game as a step toward player autonomy that was unjustly criticized by
the popular press. One noted,
At first glance, the negative media reaction is simply a response to an ill-conceived
game. More subtly, it is an indirect rebuke of the players for not saving for a rainy day.
But the criticism runs deeper than that and cuddles up to a deep-seated paternalism that
often places the news media closer to management than to players. It's all right for
players to make money for owners, to keep the plantation lighted and warm. But take a
step - even an uncertain baby step - toward autonomy, and the whip-wielders crack
the whip.
William C. Rhoden, Where Charity Begins, N.Y. TIMEs, Dec. 12, 1998, at Dl. While I sympathize
with that position, I think the negative media reaction was largely due to the promotion of the
game as a charitable contribution to NBA players (and UNICEF), not a generalized reaction to the
players attempting to seize control of their own labor by establishing, for example, a rival basket-
ball league.
61. See, e.g., Wise, supra note 55, at DI (detailing some of Kenny Anderson's philanthropic
activities).
62. Oscar Robertson, a former president of the players union and member of the Basketball
Hall of Fame, was one of the few commentators to attempt to put the players' salaries in perspec-
tive. See Oscar Robertson, Instead of Hoops, the Blame Game, N.Y. TIMEs, Nov. 7, 1998, at A15.
63. See Richard Sandomir, Charting Profit And Loss in the N.B.A., N.Y. TIMEs, Dec. 24,
1998, at Dl.
64. See id.; Paul G. Barr, Lockout Can't Sink Most NBA Stocks, PENSIONS & INVESTMENTS,
Nov. 2, 1998, at 1.
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tales of financial hardship sell better than stories of success, espe-
cially when the tales involve complaints of rich celebrities, the
owners emerged from the lockout relatively unscathed while the
players and their union were portrayed as personifications of ava-
rice.
65
Failing to cement its underdog image through poverty, the
union turned to race. The dispute, after all, pitted a union whose
membership was about eighty-five gercent black against owners
who were, without exception, white. Many of the players, includ-
ing some on the union's negotiating committee, publicly stated
that they thought the league showed the players' union a lack of
respect that was based, at least in part, on race.67 The owners
claimed that the union was just using racial identity to maintain
union discipline and strengthen its bargaining position.68 In any
case, both owners and players said that race complicated the nego-
tiations. 69
Race, though, never became an issue that connected the ath-
letes with their more workaday counterparts. Perhaps this is be-
cause the 'issue was viewed as a negotiating strategy without any
real roots in player dissatisfaction. As one commentator noted, the
players' collective awareness of being black was "sold to NBA
Properties a long time ago. 7 ° Whatever the reason, the union and
its member players were never really able to use race as an effec-
tive means of plugging into a larger group identity, or of forging a
connection with a working public that could not see fit to sympa-
thize with the players' plight.
The tremendous differences between the concerns of NBA
players and those of average workers may have left the public with
little sense that unions can make a difference in their working
lives. That perception would only be enhanced by many of the
other high profile labor disputes involving unions with affluent
65. See, e.g., Rick Reilly, Just Trying to Make an Indecent Wage, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED,
Nov. 9, 1998, at 142 (contrasting the NBA labor dispute with the ongoing strike by 1,200 Peterbilt
truck workers and concluding that "[tihere are two major labor disputes in America right now ...
[and] one of them is a joke").
66. See Selena Roberts & Mike Wise, Both Sides in N.B.A. Lockout Say Race Complicates




70. Rhoden, supra note 60, atDl.
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memberships. Airline pilots, for example, have been flexing their
muscle despite the fact that their rights to strike are severely lim-
ited under the Railway Labor Act. And physicians-the archetype
of an elite profession-are organizing in astonishing numbers in
reaction to the dominance of health maintenance organizations.1
So as labor is receiving some well-deserved publicity, the head-
lines reinforce the public perception of a labor movement that in-
creasingly caters to the wealthy and powerful. And, given the re-
cent difficulties that more ordinary unions have had exercising
their power, that perception may not be far from reality.
This public image of the detached state of labor has only been
strengthened by a recent spate of stories of union corruption. In
New York City, for example, officials of District Council 37, a
union representing 120,000 municipal workers, may have embez-
zled millions of dollars and engaged in voter fraud to ensure ratifi-
cation of an unpopular contract. The prominence of elite bargain-
ing units and the tales of corruption may contribute to the public's
feeling that many unions have nothing to offer the average worker.
The message sent by the NBA lockout might have been: "If
Michael Jordan can use the collective bargaining process to
achieve results, so can you." But professional athletes are not coal
miners or factory workers, and the public seems to recognize it.
Union leaders acknowledge that the recent high profile disputes
with pilots and professional basketball players do not help labor's
image.73 And polls that reflect decreasing support for labor point to
the allegedly harmful effect that unions have on the economy and
union corruption. 74 The NBA dispute, by highlighting a group of
wealthy employees completely disconnected from the fans and
greater public, will only strengthen negative opinions of labor.
The potentially negative publicity attendant to the lockout will
only add to labor's woes. At the root of many explanations for la-
bor's decline is that workers' general attitudes toward unions have
changed. And, those attitudes may be some of the best predictors
71. See Steven Greenhouse, Angered by H.M.O.'s Treatment, More Doctors Are Joining
Unions, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 4, 1999, at Al.
72. See Steven Greenhouse, Scandals Affirm New York As Union Corruption Capital, N.Y.
TIMES, Feb. 15, 1999, at BI. For a good catalogue of recent instances of union corruption, see Ste-
ven Greenhouse, Corruption Tests Labor While It Recruits, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 3, 1999, § 1, at 14.
73. See Greenhouse, supra note 49, at 4.
74. See James Atleson, Law and Union Power: Thoughts on the United States and Canada,
42 BuFF. L. REV. 463,486 (1994).
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of the outcome of certification elections.75 Without a sense of the
collective, workers may be more prone to see unions as unrespon-
sive to their needs, and high profile labor disputes such as the
NBA lockout only reinforce those views.
V. CONCLUSION
The players stood their ground, the lockout ended, and a sea-
son of professional basketball, albeit an abridged version, has been
salvaged. While the dispute had very little, if any, effect upon the
development of labor law doctrine, it does provide an illuminating
contrast with the weakened state of the American labor movement.
Ironically enough, the only actual effect of the labor dispute on the
landscape may be its contribution to growing cynicism that the la-
bor movement has little to offer the ordinary worker. And, despite
some isolated labor victories, 6 that view may not be far off the
mark.
75. See, e.g., Sharon Rabin Margalioth, The Significance of Worker Attitudes: Individualism
as a Cause for Labor's Decline, 16 HOFSTRA LAB. & EMP. L.J. 133, 135-36 (1998) (arguing that
any "serious attempt to explain labor's decline... must take into account social attitudes of work-
ers"). But see Chaison & Rose, supra note 30, at 30-31 (cataloging the studies on the effect of
public attitudes about labor as a factor in the growth or decline of union membership, and conclud-
ing that such attitudes have little explanatory power).
76. See, e.g., Steven Greenhouse, In Biggest Drive Since 1937, Union Gains A Victory, N.Y.
TimmS, Feb. 26, 1999, at Al (reporting a union's success in organizing California homecare work-
ers).
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